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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee
v.
BRAD H.HANSEN

:

Case No. 20010586-SC
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant
INTRODUCTION
In ordering the prosecutor to review Ms. Powell's psychological records, the trial
judge violated Mr. Hansen's due process right to in-camera review of those records. In
its brief, the State attempts to shift the blame for the violation of this right from the trial
judge to Mr. Hansen. Specifically, the State claims that Mr. Hansen waived his right to
in-camera review by inviting the trial judge to err. To the contrary, Mr. Hansen requested
specific psychological records, the contents of which had a reasonable likelihood of
including exculpatory evidence about Ms. Powell's perception, memory, and veracity.
Because the trial judge erred and not Mr. Hansen, the inviting-the-error doctrine has no
application here. Mr. Hansen more than adequately preserved the trial judge's error and
that error now requires correction on appeal.

ANALYSIS
THE TRIAL JUDGE DENIED MR. HANSEN HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO IN-CAMERA REVIEW
OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM'S PSYCHOLOGICAL
RECORDS
Contratry to the State's assertions, Mr. Hansen more than adequately preserved the
trial judge's refusal to review the psychological records in camera. Mr. Hansen
thoroughly instructed the judge on the law and gave the judge a full opportunity to
correctly apply it. When presented with this information, the trial judge misconstrued the
law and ordered the prosecutor to review the psychological records. In no sense did Mr.
Hansen waive this issue by intentionally inviting the judge to err. Rather, the trial judge
violated Mr. Hansen's constitutionally-protected right to in-camera review.

A.

Mr. Hansen Preserved For Appeal the Denial
of In-Camera Review of Specifically Requested
Psychological Records

The record reveals that trial counsel preserved the denial of in-camera review. To
preserve an issue for appeal, generally Ma contemporaneous objection or some form of
specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court record."
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987). The purpose for this rule is two-fold.
First, "in the interest of orderly procedure, the trial court ought to be given an opportunity
to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it." State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29,
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36 (Utah), cert, denied 493 U.S. 814 (1989). Second, requiring a contemporaneous
objection precludes counsel from foregoing obje uons "as part of a trial strategy that
counsel thinks will enhance the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy
fails, . . . claim[ing] on appeal that the Court should reverse[.]" State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d
155, 159 (Utah 1989), cert, denied 497 U.S. 1024 (1990); see State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d
937, 939 (Utah 1996).
Here, Mr. Hansen provided the trial judge more than an adequate opportunity to
consider the applicable law and to determine whether the judge was constitutionally
required to review Ms. Powell's treatment records in camera. Mr. Hansen filed a motion
specifically citing the relevant case law and explaining that he had a due process right to
in-camera review of the psychological records. R. 42-61. Then, at a hearing on the
motion, trial counsel specifically identified the case law and the factual basis requiring incamera review. R. 173.
This Court's preservation rules required Mr. Hansen to do nothing more. In State
v. Saunders. 1999 UT 59, f7, 992 P.2d 951, the defendant filed a motion in limine to
exclude all evidence of bad acts occurring before the period charged in the Information.
The trial court denied the motion and required the defendant to object at trial to any
specific prior acts admitted at trial. IcL This Court ruled that the trial judge erred in
requiring specific objections at trial because the motion in limine "clearly brought the
issue . . . to the trial court's attention." Id at ^f 19. Specifically, the trial court's ruling
3

"made unnecessary any further objection to that type of evidence by defense counsel so as
to be able to raise the issue of the validity of the order on appeal." Id,
Similaxly, in State v. Emmett 839 P.2d 781, 783 (Utah 1992), trial counsel
requested the trial judge to dismiss a charge following the end of the State's case. IdL
The trial judge reserved ruling on the motion until he could review the entire record. IdL
Trial counsel then proceeded with the defense case. Id, The State claimed on appeal that
the defendant waived this issue by proceeding with his case. Id This Court rejected the
State's claim and ruled that if defendants properly raise a challenge to an issue below,
they need not "take exception to a trial court's erroneous ruling in order to preserve the
issue on appeal." Id, As the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provide, criminal
defendants need not repeatedly remind judges of their erroneous rulings if they have
"state[d] [their] objections to the actions of the court and the reasons therefor." Utah R.
Crim. Proc. 20. Rather, this Court concluded that the defendant need only "raise the
claims at the appropriate time at the trial level, so the trial judge has an opportunity to rule
on the issue." L±
Moreover, this Court has ruled further that parties need not object at trial or renew
an objection to a pretrial motion to suppress when the same judge presides at both the
motion hearing and at trial. State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1071-72 (Utah 1987).1
!

This Court overruled Johnson on unrelated grounds in State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d
484, 489 (Utah 1997). This Court then overruled Doporto in State v. Decorso. 1999 UT
57, ^[15, 993 P.2d 837. Despite these competing decisions, Johnson's holding on the
4

Here, the same judge presided at both the motion hearing and at trial. R. 173-75. This
rule applies with particular force to motions for in-camera review of witness
psychological records given trial judges' duty to "conduct[] an ongoing review" of the
materiality of treatment records throughout the trial, even when a different judge presides
at the pretrial motion hearing. State v. Martin. 1999 UT 72, ^}19, 984 P.2d 975. Thus,
motions for in-camera review of witness psychological records presents an even stronger
case for not requiring renewal of the motion than in cases involving suppression hearings.
As these cases show, Mr. Hansen undeniably preserved his request for in-camera
review when he filed a pretrial motion and argued the merits of the motion at a pretrial
hearing. Like the defendants in Saunders, Emmett and Johnson. Mr. Hansen gave the
trial judge had ample opportunity to correctly rule on his requests.

B.

Mr, Hansen Had a Constitutional Right to InCamera Review of the Psychological Records

Due process of law required the trial judge to review Ms. Powell's psychological
records in camera. Mr. Hansen sufficiently showed a reasonable likelihood that Ms.
Powell's psychological disorders affected her memory, perception, and veracity. Thus,
Pennsylvania v.Ritchie. 480 U.S. 39 (1987), and State v. Cardall 1999 UT 51, 982 P.2d
79, constitutionally required the trial judge to review the records in camera himself rather

preservation issue remains sound law.
5

than delegating that duty to the prosecutor.
Criminal defendants have a due process right to in-camera review of a witness's
psychological records whenever they "show with reasonable certainty that exculpatory
evidence exists which would be favorable to [the] defense.'1 Cardall, 1999 UT 51, ft30,
982 P.2d 79. Mr. Hansen more than adequately met this burden. He had specific
knowledge that Ms. Powell had been treated for ADHD, depression, and anxiety and was
taking medication at the time of the alleged rape for these disorders. R. 173: 7, 17-18.
Discovery, provided by the State, revealed medical records that referred to Ms. Powell's
treatment at Wasatch Canyons Counseling Center. R. 49; 98-99; 173: 17-18. Ms. Powell
admitted at the preliminary hearing that she had received such treatment. R. 173: 18.
Armed with tliis information, Mr. Hansen argued that the treatment records were
necessary to develop his defense of consent because Ms. Powell's psychological
problems and her medications ffinterfere[d] with her ability to accurately perceive events
and her ability to accurately recall and relay" them. R. 173: 18.
Mr. Hansen had well-founded concerns about Ms. Powell's mental acuity.
According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th Edition
(1994) ("DSM-IV"), the diagnostic criteria for ADHD include appearing to frequently fail
to "listen," becoming "easily distracted by extraneous stimuli," and being "often forgetful
in daily activities." DSM-IV at 84. Similarly, persons suffering from major depression
have "difficulty thinking, concentrating, or making decisions." Id at 320. Depressed
6

persons may also "appear easily distracted or complain of memory difficulties." Id at
322. Generalized Anxiety Disorder, likewise, causes "difficulty concentrating" and
relaxing. IcL at 433. Persons with this disorder also find "it difficult to keep worrisome
thoughts from interfering with attention to tasks at hand and . . . stopping the
worrfisome]" thoughts. IdL
By definition, all three of these disorders potentially interfered with Ms. Powell's
ability to perceive and encode information correctly and then to accurately recall it later.
As this Court has ruled, "[ejvidence showing a witness's inability to perceive, recall, or
relate events at issue in a trial may be crucial to establishing the truth." State v. Bakalov.
1999 UT 45, p 2 , 979 P.2d 799. "Evidence of mental illness is material when it 'may
reasonably cast doubt on the ability or willingness of a witness to tell the truth.'" Id.
(quoting United States v. Smith. 77 F.3d 511, 516 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). The disclosure of
this type of evidence is especially important when, as here, "the prosecution rests much of
its case on th[e] [mentally ill] witness's testimony." Id
All of Ms. Powell's mental disorders had a reasonable likelihood of affecting her
perception, concentration, memory, and veracity. Because Mr. Hansen satisfied CardalPs
threshold showing, the trial judge was constitutionally bound to review Ms. Powell's
mental health records in camera.
The State distorts the trial court record when it claims that Mr. Hansen "was not
certain the requested records even existed." State's Brief at 13. To the contrary, trial
7

counsel specifically requested Ms. Powell's records of therapy sessions prior to the
alleged rape. R. 173: 7. Counsel knew the records existed based on Ms. Powell's
preliminary hearing testimony and the discovery that the State had provided. R. 173: 7,
17-18. These records showed that Ms. Powell suffered from ADHD, depression, and
anxiety, and that she was taking medication for these disorders at the time of the alleged
rape. R. 173: 18. Trial counsel also requested Ms. Powell's records of her therapy
sessions occurring after the alleged rape. R. 173: 7. But, trial counsel conceded that she
had no specific knowledge that such records existed. R. 173: 7. Rather, she reasoned that
a person who claimed to have been raped likely would have discussed that event with her
therapist. R. 173: 7, 25-26.
The record refutes the State's implication that trial counsel merely speculated that
therapy records existed. Although counsel admitted that she was not aware of the
contents of therapy sessions occurring after the alleged rape, she had specific, detailed
knowledge that Ms. Powell was being treated for several psychological disorders at the
time of the incident. There was no dispute that this specific information existed because
the prosecutor and Ms. Powell herself produced that information. The trial judge
overlooked these facts and concluded that Mr. Hansen had only made a speculative,
"general" request for records. R. 173: 27. In making this ruling, the trial judge appears to
have confused trial counsel's requests for pre-incident records with the post-incident
records. R. 173:27-28.
8

The trial judge was constitutionally required to review the records even if Mr.
Hansen could not conclusively establish their materiality. In Bakalov, this Court forbade
prosecutors from substituting their judgment for the defendant's whenever the question of
materiality "is at all close." Id at fl38. Rather, any "doubts should be resolved in favor of
disclosure." Id Favoring disclosure is particularly appropriate when considering witness
psychological records. Because criminal defendants lack direct access to such records,
they have limited ability to establish the materiality of the evidence. Commonwealth v.
Bishop, 617 N.E.2d 990, 996 n.6 (Mass. 1993). Although some minimal showing of
relevancy is needed, courts should "resolv[e] any doubt in favor o f in-camera review to
compensate for defendants' inaccessibility to the evidence. Id at 995, 998. This
approach properly respects the defendant's due process right to obtain exculpatory
evidence. Id. at 995.
The evidence presented at trial eliminated any doubt about the materiality of Ms.
Powell's psychological records. Ms. Powell's strange behavior, conflicting versions of
the incident, and apparent disdain for the truth cast serious doubt on her mental stability,
memory, and veracity. In fact, Ms. Powell's strange behavior was fully consistent with
her mental illnesses. She exhibited severe anxiety when Mr. Hansen's mother telephoned
her and she was afraid to speak even after several promptings. R. 175: 189-90. Ms.
Powell's repeated telephone calls to Mr. Hansen throughout the evening further showed
her extreme anxiety over Mr. Hansen and her dependence on him. R. 175: 191-92.
9

Likewise, Ms. Powell repeatedly demonstrated impulsiveness, a by-product of
ADHD. DSM-IV at 84. When she met Mr. Hansen's step-father for the first time she
immediately hugged him and expressed her desire to be his daughter-in-law someday. R.
175: 205. Then, when meeting Mr. Hansen's mother for the first time she easily took
offense at the mother's advice and blurted out that she had already engaged in sexual
relations with Mr. Hansen. R. 175: 196. DSM-IV identifies "blurt[ing] out answers
before questions have been completed" as a diagnostic criteria for ADHD. DSM-IV at
84. And, Mr. Hansen's reports that Ms. Powell would suddenly act bizarrely and even try
to hit him is consistent with the ADHD symptoms of "low frustration tolerance [and]
temper outbursts." DSM-IV at 80.
The State counters that this Court cannot consider evidence presented at trial in
reviewing the denial of the motion for in-camera review because this information was not
before the trial judge. State's Brief at 19 n.4. The State's analysis is faulty on several
levels. First of all, the same judge who presided over the motion hearing also presided at
trial. The trial judge, thus, heard all of the evidence about Ms. Powell's bizarre behavior
and disregard for the truth. Further, because the trial judge had a duty to "conduct[] an
ongoing review" of the materiality of Ms. Powell's treatment records, even at trial, the
State cannot complain that all of the evidence was not before the trial judge. State v.
Martin, 1999 UT 72,1119, 984 P.2d 975.
In any event, the cases the State cites do not support its proposition that "an
10

appellate court may affirm, but will not reverse, a ruling based on evidence not before the
district court at the time it ruled." State's Brief at 19 n.4. Two cases the State cites hold
that if new evidence on the constitutionality of a detention emerges following a
suppression hearing, the challenger must raise the new evidence to give the trial court an
opportunity to consider it. United States v. Hicks, 978 F.2d 722. 724 (DC. Cir 1993);
Aiken v. State, 647 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Md. Spec. App. 1994). But, Mr. Hansen's case is
distinguishable because criminal defendants generally have no knowledge of or access to
the contents of witness psychological records. Thus, even if they learn new information
about a witness, they lack the resources to link that information to evidence contained in
treatment records. It would be unfair, inefficient, and impractical to require defendants to
repeatedly object to unknown information every time they learn something new about a
witness. For that very reason, prosecutors and trial judges have a continuing duty to
review psychological records for exculpatory evidence. Martin, 1999 UT 72, ^[19, 984
P.2d 975.
Several cases that the State cites actually hold that M[t]he entire record is
considered on appeal which includes evidence . . . . at trial" when reviewing the denial of
a pretrial motion. United States v. Muniz, 1 F.3d 1018, 1021 (10th Cir.), cert, denied 510
U.S. 1002 (1993); see United States v. Martin, 982 F.2d 1236, 1240 n.2 (8th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Basev, 816 F.2d 980, 983 n.l (5th Cir. 1987); State v. Kong, 883 P.2d
686, 688 (Haw. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Young, 576 So. 2d 1048, 1054 n.l (La. Ct. App.
11

1991); State v. Duncan. 879 S.W.2d 749, 751 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). The remaining cases
limit their review to the evidence before the trial court at the time the motion was
decided, but, they do not specifically address whether an appellate court can also rely on
evidence produced at trial. Baez v. State. 425 S.E.2d 885, 890 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)
(refusing to consider warrant produced after oral argument in appellate court); State v.
Ryder. 315 N.W.2d 786, 788-89 (Iowa 1982) (limiting review to motion because
appellant failed to produce suppression hearing transcript); Commonwealth v. Powers.
398 A.2d 1013, 1014 (Pa. 1979) (not addressing preliminary hearing transcript). The
State's arguments are baseless.
Because Mr. Hansen requested specific records that had a reasonable likelihood of
revealing material information about Ms. Powell's mental acuity and veracity, the trial
judge erred in denying in-camera review. Ritchie. 480 U.S. at 60; Cardall 1999 UT 51,
P 0 , 982 P.2d 79. This Court should, thus, remand this matter for such a review.

C.

Because Mr, Hansen Preserved His Challenege
to the Denial of In-Camera Review, He Did Not
Waive His Right to Appellate Review

Further contrary to the State's claims, trial counsel did not waive the challenge to
the denial of in-camera review by failing to renew his motion. The State misconstrues the
waiver doctrine when it claims that trial counsel "affirmatively]" waived the right to
appellate review. State's Brief at 14. This Court has ruled that "if a party through
12

counsel has made a conscious decision to refrain from objecting or has led the trial court
into error, we will then decline to save that part} iiom the error" and refuse to even
review the appeal for plain error. Bullock, 791 P.2d at 158. But, this approach, called the
invited error doctrine, only applies if the failure to object resulted from "a consciously
chosen strategy of trial counsel rather than an oversight." LdL at 158-59; see United States
v. Olano. 507 U.S. 725, 733-34 (1993) (distinguishing between merely failing to object
and intentionally forfeiting a known right); State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah
1987) (defendants can only "consciously," "actively," or "affirmatively" waive right to
appellate review). This doctrine, thus, penalizes parties for "tactical strategy" but not for
"innocent omissions." Robert J. Labrum, Comment, History and Application of the Plain
Error Doctrine in Utah, 2000 Utah L. Rev. 537, 550-51.
No invited error occurred here. In the first place, that doctrine has no application
because, as explained above, Mr. Hansen filed a proper, timely motion for in-camera
review. Bullock, 791 P.2d at 158-59. Second, Mr. Hansen did not mislead or
"manipulate the court" into committing error. Labrum, 2000 Utah L. Rev. at 550.
Rather, he cited the applicable law and properly presented his arguments for in-camera
review. The trial judge then considered the arguments and erroneously concluded that
Mr. Hansen had only made a general, speculative request for information. Thus, Mr.
Hansen engaged in no manipulation or misleading. Moreover, the cases the State cites to
support its claim of invited error do not apply because the defendant in each of those
13

cases either strategically failed to object or relied at trial on the same evidence challenged
on appeal. State's Brief at 14-15 (citing Sate v. Laffertv, 2001 UT 19, 20 P.3d 342, cert,
denied 122 S Ct. 542 (2001) (defendant could not complain of lack of notice of experts'
reports because he did not provide notice of his own experts' reports); State v. Harmon,
956 P.2d 262, 269 (Utah 1998) (defendant made tactical decision not to request a curative
instruction); Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d 516, 520 (Utah), cert, denied 513 U.S. 966
(1994) (defendant's reliance on sworn statement precluded review of the statement);
Bullock, 791 P.2d at 159 (involving "conscious strategy'1 to attack quality of state's
evidence rather than oppose admission of that evidence); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546,
561 (Utah 1987) (defendant ,finitiate[d]" erroneous argument that he could be paroled if
given a life sentence)).
Third, the State has not even attempted to infer any "conceivable strategic
purpose" for not renewing the motion for in-camera review. State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d
937, 939 (Utah 1996). Because this case involved a classic "he said," she said" situation,
Mr. Hansen's only defense was to attack Ms. Powell's veracity and credibility. Declining
to seek access to the psychological records and miss discovering potentially exculpatory
information would not have "enhance[d] [Mr. Hansen's] chances of acquittal." Bullock,
791 P.2d at 159. Rather, the only reasonable inference from counsel's decision not to
further request the psychological records, was that once the prosecutor represented that
the records contained no exculpatory evidence, trial counsel believed that there was
14

nothing for her to request the trial judge to review.
The State, nevertheless, complains that Mr. Hansen should have renewed the
motion for in-camera review because the trial judge offered to "'revisit'" the issue after
the prosecutor reviewed the psychological records. State's Brief at 14 (quoting R. 173:
28). The State misunderstands the trial judge's ruling. The trial judge initially erred in
finding that Mr. Hansen had not made a specific request for information. R. 173: 28.
Instead, he ordered the prosecutor to "determine whether these records do exist." R. 173:
28. If the prosecutor found any psychological records, she was to "review those and
determine what evidence, if any, [is] appropriate to the claim or defense." R. 173: 28.
The trial judge then ruled that if the parties found "further issue on this or some
point of disagreement in some of these records that you suspect or find do exist, [trial
counsel] can come back, and I will revisit that, probably in an in-camera review." R. 173:
28. Trial counsel then requested the prosecutor to prepare an index of the records found
to create "an adequate record, should we need to have an appellate court review" the
prosecutor's determination. R. 173: 28. The trial judge agreed to order the prosecutor to
prepare the index. R. 173: 29.
Finally, the prosecutor reviewed the psychological records for therapy sessions
occurring both before and after the alleged rape and concluded that the records contained
nothing "exculpatory" or "relevant." R. 98; Addendum. The prosecutor identified the
dates of the therapy sessions and disclosed the doctors' notes that listed the medications
15

that Ms. Powell was taking. R. 100-02. She concealed, however, the doctors' other
notes, including a history of Ms. Powell's mental illnesses. R. 98-102.
As these facts establish, the trial judge only allowed trial counsel to "revisit" the
request for in-camera review if, after the prosecutor's review, the parties found "further
issue on this or some point of disagreement in some of these records." R. 173: 28. But,
based on the prosecutor's representations and her limited disclosures, no basis existed
upon which trial counsel could revisit her motion or disagree with the prosecutor's
conclusions. Based on the judge's explicit order, there were no grounds for trial counsel
to request the trial judge to conduct an in-camera review.
If anything, the hearing on the motion for in-camera review reveals that trial
counsel thoroughly preserved the record for appeal. Recognizing that the trial judge's
erroneous ruling created an appealable issue, she asked the judge to order the preparation
of an index to assist this Court on appeal. Trial counsel apparently realized that because
the trial judge had denied her access to the records, she hoped to provide something to
facilitate appellate review. Trial counsel did all she could reasonably do to preserve the
denial of the motion for in-camera review for this Court's consideration. Rather than
penalizing trial counsel as the State suggests, this Court should commend counsel for her
diligence in creating an adequate record for appeal.
The State implies further that this Court's recent opinion in State v. Cramer, 2002
UT 9, 44 P.3d 690, required Mr. Hansen to renew his motion for in-camera review.
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State's Brief at 21. The State's partial quotation of Cramer inaccurately portrays this
Court's ruling in that case. The full quotation reveals that this Court merely held that
Ritchie and Cardall provide for in-camera review of potentially material witness
psychological records but they do not allow criminal defendants direct access them:
Cramer further contends that because his requests were
sufficiently "specific," he was entitled to direct access to M.L.'s
medical records under Ritchie. Cramer misinterprets Ritchie.
Although "a defendant ... aware of specific information
contained in [a] file [containing privileged records]... is free to
request it directly from the court, and argue in favor of its
materiality," Ritchie. 480 U.S. at 60, 107 S.Ct. 989 (emphasis
added), this does not automatically entitle the defendant to
receive the requested records: the court must still assess whether
the records are indeed material. See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 58 n.
15,59-60, 107 S.Ct. 989: State v. Cardall 1999 UT 51,ffl|3335, 982 P.2d 79 (noting that defendant "specifically requested
that the trial court review" certain records).
Cramer. 2002 UT 9, |28 n.3, 44 P.3d 690.
Contrary to the State's implications, this quotation fails to address the invited error
doctrine, at all. Rather, it merely confirms that defendants do not have a right to direct
access to witnesses' psychological records. To secure their due process right to in-camera
review defendants must, instead, request the trial judge to review potentially exculpatory
records. Because Mr. Hansen requested the trial judge for in-camera review of specific
information that reasonably likely contained material information, he secured his right to
in-camera review. Cardall 1990 UT 51, p o , 982 P.2d 79.
Regardless of the characterization of the record below, this Court should only
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apply the invited error doctrine when certain that counsel has engaged in misconduct.
Because invited error results in the drastic loss of even plain error review of constitutional
rights, this Court should only find a waiver when the record reveals "a consciously chosen
strategy of tnal counsel rather than an oversight." Bullock, 791 P.2d at 158-59.
"c[E]very reasonable presumption should be made against the waiver, especially when it
relates to a right or privilege deemed so valuable as to be secured by the Constitution.'"
State v. Johnson. 611 N.E.2d 414, 418 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Simmons v. State.
79 N.E. 555, 557 (Ohio 1906)). When in doubt, "it would be better to upset the system
than to allow an innocent person to be punished." Labrum, 2000 Utah L. Rev. at 553.
Because the record reveals no indication of any strategic "maneuvering," the invited error
doctrine has no application in this case. Id at 573.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Hansen requests this Court to remand this matter to the trial court and to order
the trial judge to review Ms. Powell's psychological records for exculpatory evidence in
camera.

SUBMITTED this ^

day of May, 2002.

KENT R. HART
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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